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Avioane de lupta si comandament NATO in Romania

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200 de militari NATO cu aeronave de lupta vor stationa pe teritoriul Romaniei imediat dupa summit-ul NATO ce incepe joi la Cardiff.

Prezenta se va permanentiza pentru securizarea granitei de Est a NATO, o parte din aceasta fiind comuna cu cea a Romaniei.

Traian Basescu a declarat ca “Romania doreste si instalarea unui comandament aliat” care sa coordoneze o parte din operatiunile dedicate securizarii frontierei aliate.

PS : O veste buna in pragul summit-ului – http://www.antena3.ro/externe/franta-suspenda-livrarea-primei-nave-de-razboi-mistral-catre-rusia-265630.html

 

10 COMMENTS

  1. Nu sunt încă în ţară? ştiam că sunt din primăvara anului trecut şi aşteaptă semnalele! vă puteţi închipui ce haos, ce huială va fi pe cer, zi şi noapte avioanele militare, zgomotul asurzitor, vor fi insuportabile, te trezeşte din somn şi îţi provoacă fiori. În Elveţia unde zboară avioanele cu turişti pe deasupra, la vedere, fac zgomot destul şi-ţi stîrnesc nervii, dar în cazul nostru,…vai de mama noastră!!! (aluzia la comentatorii, analiştii ploitici care au lucrat cu avioane-băse, vizează profesionistul din tine?)

  2. Puţin, aşa, mă gîndesc(realitatea imediată),…ce-ar fi să rămîn tot eu pe scaunul nr.1 al ţării??? …că am,,esperenţă” destulă în tot şi toate, 10ani, vă hărţuiesc non-stop, americanii-NATO sunt pe mînă cu mine, îi am la mînă, pot să fac ce vreau din ei, la fel ca şi cu ai mei, nu vă mai pierdeţi vremea! …de fapt, ţineţi în prostire poporul că e bine aşa…!

  3. Cele doua nave portelicopter de tip Mistral sa intre in componenta fortei de autoaparare a UE si sa execute misiuni de patrulare/salvare in Marea Mediterana.

  4. Un comentariu pertinent in “Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy” by George Friedman- extras:
    The Centrality of Romania
    The second critical country is Romania. The Montreux Convention prohibits the unlimited transit of a naval force into the Black Sea through the Bosporus, controlled by Turkey. Romania, however, is a Black Sea nation, and no limitations apply to it, although its naval combat power is centered on a few aging frigates backed up by a half-dozen corvettes. Apart from being a potential base for aircraft for operations in the region, particularly in Ukraine, supporting Romania in building a significant naval force in the Black Sea — potentially including amphibious ships — would provide a deterrent force against the Russians and also shape affairs in the Black Sea that might motivate Turkey to cooperate with Romania and thereby work with the United States. The traditional NATO structure can survive this evolution, even though most of NATO is irrelevant to the problems facing the Black Sea Basin. Regardless of how the Syria-Iraq drama ends, it is secondary to the future of Russia’s relationship with Ukraine and the European Peninsula. Poland anchors the North European Plain, but the action for now is in the Black Sea, and that makes Romania the critical partner in the European Peninsula. It will feel the first pressure if Russia regains its position in Ukraine.
    I have written frequently on the emergence — and the inevitability of the emergence — of an alliance based on the notion of the Intermarium, the land between the seas. It would stretch between the Baltic and Black seas and would be an alliance designed to contain a newly assertive Russia. I have envisioned this alliance stretching east to the Caspian, taking in Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Poland-to-Romania line is already emerging. It seems obvious that given events on both sides of the Black Sea, the rest of this line will emerge.
    The United States ought to adopt the policy of the Cold War. That consisted of four parts. First, allies were expected to provide the geographical foundation of defense and substantial forces to respond to threats. Second, the United States was to provide military and economic aid as necessary to support this structure. Third, the United States was to pre-position some forces as guarantors of U.S. commitment and as immediate support. And fourth, Washington was to guarantee the total commitment of all U.S. forces to defending allies, although the need to fulfill the last guarantee never arose.
    The United States has an uncertain alliance structure in the Greater Black Sea Basin that is neither mutually supportive nor permits the United States a coherent power in the region given the conceptual division of the region into distinct theaters. The United States is providing aid, but again on an inconsistent basis. Some U.S. forces are involved, but their mission is unclear, it is unclear that they are in the right places, and it is unclear what the regional policy is.
    Thus, U.S. policy for the moment is incoherent. A Black Sea strategy is merely a name, but sometimes a name is sufficient to focus strategic thinking. So long as the United States thinks in terms of Ukraine and Syria and Iraq as if they were on different planets, the economy of forces that coherent strategy requires will never be achieved. Thinking in terms of the Black Sea as a pivot of a single diverse and diffuse region can anchor U.S. thinking. Merely anchoring strategic concepts does not win wars, nor prevent them. But anything that provides coherence to American strategy has value.
    The Greater Black Sea Basin, as broadly defined, is already the object of U.S. military and political involvement. It is just not perceived that way in military, political or even public and media calculations. It should be. For that will bring perception in line with fast-emerging reality.

    Read more: Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy | Stratfor

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